

# Maxime Liégey

---

CONTACT INFORMATION	University of Strasbourg 61, Avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 Strasbourg Cedex Phone: +33 (0)6 48 07 74 90 Website: <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/liegeym">https://sites.google.com/site/liegeym</a> E-mail: <a href="mailto:liegeym@gmail.com">liegeym@gmail.com</a>	
PERSONAL INFORMATION	Born: March 24, 1983 in Strasbourg Citizenship: French Family situation: two children	
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT	<i>Université de Strasbourg, France</i> Assistant Professor of Economics ( <i>Maître de conférence contractuel</i> )	Sep 2019-present
EDUCATION	<i>Toulouse School of Economics</i> Ph.D. in Economics: <i>Essays in labor markets and firm dynamics</i>  Thesis committee: <i>Thomas Chaney (advisor), Patrice Fève, Marti Mestieri &amp; Gilles Saint-Paul</i>  <i>Toulouse School of Economics</i> M.Sc. in Economics  <i>HEC-Paris &amp; Ecole Polytechnique</i> M.Sc. in Quantitative Economics and Finance  <i>HEC-Paris</i> M.Sc. in Management	2012-2017     2007-2008  2006-2007  2003-2007
RESEARCH FIELDS	Search-and-matching models of the labor market, Trade, Structural change, Firm Dynamics	
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND PAST EMPLOYMENT	<i>Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (PUJ) de Bogotá, Colombia</i> Assistant Professor of Economics  <i>Toulouse School of Economics</i> Project manager: access to and use of confidential microdata provided by the CASD ( <a href="https://casd.eu/en">https://casd.eu/en</a> )  <i>France Stratégie (formerly Centre d'Analyse Stratégique: <a href="http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/">http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/</a>)</i> Economist, <i>Département des Affaires Économiques et Financières</i>	2017- 2019  2013-2017  2008-2012
TEACHING EXPERIENCE AND RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIP	<i>Course: Dynamic Games and Contracts (PUJ,2019), Intermediate Macro (PUJ, 2017-19), Microeconomics - Undergraduate level (ENAC,France, 2012)</i> <i>T.A.: Macroeconomics, Microeconomics - Undergraduate level (Toulouse University 2013-2014)</i>	

R.A.: Thomas Chaney (2013-2017), Martí Mestieri (2015-2017)

#### CONFERENCES

Nov 2018: LACEA-LAMES, Guayaquil, Ecuador  
Apr 2018: IIOC, Indianapolis, USA  
Jan 2017: ASSA meetings, Chicago  
Dec 2016: RES PhD meeting, London  
Dec 2016: 41st Simposio SAEe, Bilbao

#### SKILLS

*language*: French (native), English, Spanish, German (intermediate)  
*computer*: Python, Matlab, Stata, SAS, R, LaTeX

#### RESEARCH PAPERS

**The Heterogeneous Effects of Trade across Occupations: A Test of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem** ([link to paper](#)) - submitted to *The Review of Economic Studies*  
joint with S. Basco (Universitat de Barcelona), M. Mestieri (Chicago Fed & Northwestern University) and G. Smagghue (UC3-Madrid)

This paper develops and implements a novel test of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We use nationally-representative matched employer-employee panel data from 1997 through 2015 to study the effect of the rise in China's exports on French worker earnings. Our version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that there is a negative correlation between occupational exposure to Chinese competition and changes in worker earnings. First, we document substantial heterogeneity in trade adjustment across occupations. Then, consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson prediction, we show that workers initially employed in occupations more intensively used in hard-hit industries experience larger declines in earnings. We also show that workers tend to move out of hard-hit industries, but they tend to remain in their initial occupation.

#### **Search Frictions and Management Policies** ([link to paper](#))

I build a search-and-matching featuring a simple notion of firms' management policies, whereby managers optimally allocate their time between two activities: hiring new workers versus sorting things out internally with employed workers. Managers and workers match to form firms in an uncertain environment, and use knowledge to solve upcoming problems that can interrupt production. A manager supervising a discrete number of worker decides whether to hire new workers, or to sort things out internally and help workers resume their job, with some probability of success. Complementarity between managers' and workers' knowledge in problem-solving translates into positive sorting, so that managers at larger, higher efficiency firms hire and retain workers from tighter labor markets, in line with empirical evidence. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient, as bargaining with many workers provides managers with a strategic motive to retain workers. This strategic motive is stronger when the manager bargains with each worker individually, than when it bargains with workers as a collective.

#### **A Tale of Two Margins: Random and Directed Search on Local Labor Markets**

joint with M. Gebauer (ICEF-HSE Moscow)

We develop a simple search-and-matching model of a local labor market, where heterogeneous firms choose whether or not to set up their own submarket in order to attract applicants. A local labor market is characterized by a dual structure, where lower-productivity firms match with workers in a *random search pool*, while higher-productivity can stand out to attract workers within a *directed set*, thus making it easier for them to grow in a stationary equilibrium. This dual structure implies a *structural break* in the size-wage premium, a fact that is strongly vindicated by worker-level data. We further show how the model can help interpret the *reallocation effect* resulting from an increase in the minimum wage.

#### **Domestic Outsourcing and the Rise of Local Monosponies**

Firms have outsourced a wide range of peripheral tasks over the past three decades, which is documented

to have contributed significantly to the increase in wage inequality. I develop a search and matching model where firms combine in-house “core” and peripheral tasks in production, while being offered the possibility to contract out the latter to outside services providers. Firms are heterogenous in productivity, and therefore differ in their willingness to pay for outsourced tasks, which generates an opportunity for monopolistically competing service providers to extract part of the surplus through price differentiation. As outsourcing practices spread across the economy, outsourced workers see their outside option decrease as service providers gain in labor market power.

#### REFERENCES

Pr. Thomas Chaney  
Sciences Po, Paris  
[thomas.chaney@gmail.com](mailto:thomas.chaney@gmail.com)  
Mobile: +33(0)6 95 37 70 98

Pr. Martí Mestieri  
Northwestern University  
[marti.mestieri@northwestern.edu](mailto:marti.mestieri@northwestern.edu)  
Phone: +1 847-491-8218

Pr. Gilles Saint-Paul  
Paris School of Economics  
[gilles.saint-paul@psemail.eu](mailto:gilles.saint-paul@psemail.eu)  
Phone: +33 (0)1 80 52 13 57